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The purpose of this paper is to analysis the Japanese fiscal 
p이icy particularly from the 애ewpoint of the sustainability 
problem of govemment bond policy and the fiscal reconstruction 
movement in Japan. This paper first summarizes Japan ‘ s fiscal 
p이icies in the 1990s. Then. we investigate the macroeconomic 
impact of govemment debt and fiscal difficulties of heavy 
dependency of debt finance in the public sector. We find that 
fiscal sustainability may becorne a serious issue. We also 
explore p이itical constraints to the fiscal reconstruction move 
ments. In order to realize succ:essful fiscal reconstruction. the 
central government needs to restrain 1이)bying activities of local 
p이iti.c외 groups. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to analysis the Japanese fiscal 
policy par디cularly from the 띠ewpoint of the sustainability problem 
of government bond policy and the fiscal reconstruction movement 
in Japan.. Japan's fiscal situation is the worst of the G7 countìes 
now. This is partly due to a slowdown of economic gro~πh in the 
1990s. When national income does not grow much. tax revenue will 
not increase either. On the contrary. government spending has 
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been gradually raised due to political pressures of interest groups , 
resulting in large budget deficits. In 1997 , the Japanese 
government implemented the Fisc머 Structural Reform (reducing 
budget deficits). However , in 1998 , it stopped the reform and 
implemented tax reductions and increases in public investment (the 
traditional Keynesian counter-cyclic혀 policy) because of severe 
economìc and financìal situation, and the defeat of the governing 
party (the Liberal Democratic Party; hereafter the LDP) in the upper 
house election. It ìs also noted that although the Japanese 
government bonds have been issued largely, their yields are the 
lowest among G 7 countries ín the bond market. 
In such a situation , it would be useful to consíder 단le following 
points. 1) What would cause a rapíd increase in fiscal deficits? 
2) What are the macroeconomíc effects of government deficits? 
3) How díd the government raise revenue by ìssuing bonds in the 
1990s? 4) Why would the yields of Japanese government bonds be 
so low ín spíte of theír large íssue? and 5) What would be the 
crucial point of at떠ining successful fiscal reconstruction in the 
future? Based on theories in macroeconomics and financial 
economícs. this paper inves디gates these ques디ons using Japanese 
fiscal data. We intend to incorporate the political aspect of fiscal 
policy into these analyses. This paper will thus evaluate the current 
growing dependence on government bonds for covering financíal 
deficits , the recent movements of Japanese fiscal reform and debt 
management policy. 
This paper consists of six sec디ons. In Section II. we summarize 
Japanese fiscal p이icy ín the recent years. In Section III , we 
inves디gate the macroeconomic effects of Japanese fiscal policy in 
the 1990s. Then , we analyze the problem of sus t.:'linability of 
government deficits in Section N. Section V díscusses the soft-
budget problem and political constraints ín the intergovernmental 
finance between the local and central governments. Fin려ly. 
concluding remarks follow in Section Vl. 
11. Japanese Fiscal Policy in the 1990s 
Japan’s fiscal sítuation in 2003 ís the worst of any G7 country, 
ha、이ng deteriorated rapidly with the collapse of the ‘ bubble 
economy’ in 1991 and the deep and prolonged period of economic 
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recession which ensued , and from which recovexy has been slow 
and modest despite the implement:ation of counter-cyclical p이icy. [n 
this section let us first summarize briefly the movement of fiscal 
deficits and fiscal reform in Japan. See Ihori , Doi, and Kondo 
(2001) and Ihori and Doi (2001). 
Traditionally, the Japanese government has followed a balanced 
budget policy. The balanced budget was maintained until 1965. 
when national bonds were first issued in the postwar period. The 
gap between government expenditures and tax revenues. which 
corresponds roughly to fiscal defìcits. began to expand rapidly at 
the outbreak of the first oil shock in 1973. Asako et a l. (1 991) 
presented good description of the rise and fall of deficits in the 
1970s an.d the 1980s in Japan. They interpreted that the increase 
of deficits in the second half of 1970s as a combination of several 
factors. lbe larger fiscal deficits resulted from the major burst Jf 
new spending on social welfare programs in the first half of 1970s 
and on public investment in the second half of 1970s and the lack 
of tax revenues reflecting the slowdown of economic growth. 
Since the increase in the budget deficit in 1975. deficit reduction 
has become one of the most important objectives of economíc 
policy. Eliminating fiscal deficits was officiaJly called ‘fiscal 
reconstruction. ’ The Ministxy of Finance (MOF) constantIy pressund 
each ministry of the government to hold down expenditures when 
drawing up the initial budget. Since 1982. the principle of zero 
growth requests (zero ceilin밍 has been imposed on budget requests. 
The ceiling was sharply tightened to negative increases in the la:e 
1980s. 
Furthermore. the important step was the establishment of the Ad 
Hoc Council on Administrative Reform (Rincho) in 1981. Rinct.o 
submiUed: five reports from July 1981 to March 1983 and 
recommended a number of important reforms to trim overly 
expanded portions of the governrnent bureaucracy: privatization of 
three major public corporations cuts in spending on public works 
and so on. As the result of such p이icies. the growth of government 
expenditure has indeed been restrained. 
Along with severe spending constraints imposed by Rincho 10 
promote the goal of reducing deficits , The MOF began to fall back 
on various small measures to increase tax revenues. The MOF did 
not however pursue major tax reforms that would have greaVy 
altered the basic tax structure until late 1980s. The value added 
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tax (VAT) was finally introduced in the tax structure in April 1989. 
after long-standing trial and error. 
The substantial amount of natural tax increases has been 
produced from 1986 to 1991. The abnormal hike of stock and land 
prices generated a great amount of tax revenues in the form of the 
corporate tax. the security transaction tax. capital gains tax. etc. 
Such a large amount of natural tax increases was of great help in 
reducing accumulated deficits. which in turn achieved the target of 
fiscal reconstruction by 1991. The sharp rise of 떠x revenues. 
caused by a bubble phenomenon , looks like “ windfall." “ Windfall" 
tax increases have played a 띠tal role in achieving the MOF’s target 
in the second half of 1980s. 
After a “ bubble economy" was broken in 1991. natural tax 
decreases were incurred to generate revenue. At the same time. the 
politico-economic pressures for larger expen버ture budgets 없ld 
counter-cyclical packages of fiscal measures intensified. Respon띠ng 
to them. the MOF employed some measures for s디mulating the 
aggregate demand. However. these counter-cyclical measures were 
not so effective. resul디ng in an increase in the fiscal deficit. The 
planned bond dependency rate rose from a low-point of 7.6% in FY 
1991 (initial) to 18.7% in FY 1994 (initial). The reali양 was s다11 
worse. The implementa디on of counter-cyclical fiscal policy through 
Supplementary-Budgets in-year led to further borrowing still. and 
the actual bond-dependency rate was more than 22% in FY 1994. 
The state of the national finances deteriorated rapidly throughout 
FY 1995 and FY 1996. The MOF was forced to borrow 22.0 trillion 
to finance a deficit swollen by the large fiscal stimulus in 
September 1995. resulting in a bond-dependency ratio of 28.2%. its 
highest level since 1980. In FY 1996 the planned issue of 10.1 
trillion of special deficit bonds exceeded all previous experience. 
Despite the gra띠방 of the fiscal situation the initial budgets for FY 
1996 and 1997 nevertheless provided for further increases of 
expenditure. of 5.8% and 3.0%. Not only were fixed costs for prior 
commitments rising: those for discretionary expenditures continued 
to rise as well. The servicing of that debt absorbed more than a 
fifth of the total General Account Budget. Limi디ng the latter to 
1.5% ceiling in FY 1997 was claimed by the Government and the 
MOF as a sign of new fiscal austerity. 
FY 1998 ini디al budget was drawn up making utmost efforts to 
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deal with the current economic and financial situation within the 
framework of the Fiscal Structural Reform Act. According to the 
MOF. fiscal reconstruction was equivalent to the achievement of the 
three policy-objectives of 
(i) the elimination of special balanced bonds 
(ii) the reduction of the bond-dependency ratio to reduce fiscal 
deficits on the path to a balanced budget 
(iii) the reduction of the size and service-costs of the accumulated 
debt 
The initial budget for FY 1998 marked the beginning of a new 
realism in the control of public spending promised in PM 
Hashimoto ’s ‘Vision' of fiscal structural reform. The Fiscal Struc-
tural Reform Act. which was implemented in November 1997 ‘ had 
three targets to be achieved by FY 2003 
(i) the elimination of special balanced bonds 
(ii) the reduction of general government debt-GDP ratio to 60% 
(iii) the reduction of general government deficit-GDP ratio to 3% 
General expenditures were down 1.3%) over FY 1997 initial 
budget. the largest decline in history. However. in the light of 
severe economic and financial situation. the Fiscal Structural 
Reform Act was revised in May 1998. so that income tax reduction 
would be easily implemented. Furthermore. since the LDP lost the 
upper house election in July 1998. new PM Obuchi changed the 
target of fiscal policy. Namely. further tax reductions and increases 
in public works have been implemented to stimulate the aggregate 
demand. following the traditional Keynesian counter-cyclical policy. 
The Fiscal Structural Reform Act is not regarded as a legal 
constraint any more. 
In FY 1998 the issue of special deficit bonds was 21.7 trillìon 
yen due to several fiscal policy measures. By the end of FY 1999. 
the accumulated debt was 347 trillion (168 trillion yen at the end 
of FY 1990) ‘ Figure 1 presents the accumulation of outstanding of 
bonds. Also local government bonds rapidly increase in the 1990s. 
The increase of outstanding of local bonds was from 52 trillion yen 
at the end of FY 1990 to 130 trillion yen at the end of FY lD99. In 
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Tax and Transfer Taxes increased. 1 The increase was from 1.[" 
trillion yen at the end of FY 1990 to 30 trillion yen at the end 01 
FY 1999. 13y the end of FY 1999. total outstanding of these bonds 
and borrm띠ng was 506 trillion yen (222 trillion yen at the end 01 
FY 1990). 
130nd dependency ratio rapidly rose ín the 1aUer of 1990s 
Figure 2 shows bond dependency ratio in the consolidated account, 
that is. the net total of the General Account. the Specia1 Account 
for Grants of Allocation Tax and Transfer Taxes. and the ordinary 
account (net total) of 10cal govemments. The figure was 10.9% in 
FY 1990. In FY 1999. 삼lis rose to 40.2%. The deficit on the generaJ 
govemment financial balance in FY 1999 was 10.0% of GDP. with 
a gross debt of over 108%. The inclusion of the surplus on social 
security reduced that deficit to 7 , 8%. and even that figure was 
highest among G7 countries. 
Let us compare some fiscal indicators in the 1990s among G 7 
countries. 2 On general govemment financial balance as a 
percentage of GDP. Japan’s figure was +2.9% in 1990.3 But this 
significantly drops to -7.9% in 2000. In contrast. the figure in 
other G7 countries almost improved in the 1990s. In the U.S .. the 
improvement is from -2.7% (in 1 연9이 to +0.9% (in 200이. In the 
U. K.. it wa.s -1.5% in 1990 and is +0.8% in 2000. In Germany. it 
improves from -2.1% in 1990 to -1.2% in 2000. In France. it was 
--1.6% in 1990 and is -1.7% in 2000. In Italy. it rose from 
11.2% (in 1990) to -1.6% (in 200(기. In Canada. the improvement 
is from -4.5% (in 199이 to + 1.6% (in 200(기. 
On general govemment gross debt as a percentage of GDP in thf 
1990s. Japan’s figure signific밍1디y increases from 6 l.4% (in 1990) 
to 114.1 0Ic, (in 200이. The increase of 야le figure in other G7 
countries is smaller than that in Japan. In the U.S .. this figure 
was 55.3% in 1990 and it is 57.1% in 2000. In the U.K.. it 
increases from 39.1% in 1990 to 5 1.2% in 2000. In Germany. thf 
increase is from 43.2% (in 199이 to 6 1. 7% (in 200이. France’ε， 
figure was 40.2% in 1990 and is 64.6% in 2000. In ltaly. 1t waε， 
lWe will expl허n the relationship among national govemment bond. loca] 
govemment bonds. and the Special Account for Grants of Allocation TIDI 
and Transfer Taxes in Section III. 
~e SOUI'ce of these data is OECD (1999). 
~he gener외 govemment includes the central govemment. local govem 
ment. and social security fund. 
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105.4% in 1990 and it is 115.2% in 2000. In Canada, the increase 
is frorn 71.5% (in 199이 to 82.5% (in 200이 . A cornparison of these 
fiscal indicators for Japan and six other industrialized countries 
shows the fiscal situation in Japan is worse than that in other 
countries. 
The concern for sustainability of fiscal deficits is a background 
for the fiscal reconstruction and structural reforrn rnovernent by the 
current Koizurni Adrninistration. The “ Stmctural Reforrn of the 
Japanese Econorny: Basic Policies for Macroeconomic Development" 
was decided upon after acceptance of the report cornpi1ed by the 
Counci1 on Econornic and Fiscal Policy, an advisory council to the 
Prirne Minister. In this repoπ the core of policies for the stmctural 
reforrn of the econornic society was made clear. In part of the 
policies shown. a go떠 to limit the arnount of government bond 
issues to less than 30 trillion yen in the FY 2002 budget. and 
afterwards achieve a primary surplus. was set to show that there 
exists a necessity to take on full-scale measures towards fiscal 
consolidation. However , in order to cope with the bad situation of 
macro-economy. 1.8 trillion yen of the advance tax cuts was 
employed with a view to stren!한hening the competitiveness of 
industry, fac i1itating a smooth transference of assets to the next 
generation , promoting a shift from “sa띠ng to investrnent." advancing 
effective land use. and so on. The go외 to limit the amount of 
governrnent bond issues to less than 30 trillion yen in the FY 2002 
budget was finally abandoned. In the FY 2003 , new government 
bond issues are 36.4 trillion yen and the bond dependency rises to 
44.6%. 
III. Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Policy 
Based on the above discussions. we first examine the macro-
economic effects of fiscal policy empirically. There exist competing 
arguments on the efficacy of fiscal policy in the 1990s. One 
hypothesis is that the effects of fiscal policy were very large and 
hence recession would have deepened without fiscal expansion. On 
the contrary ‘ alternative is that fiscal policy did not have an 
expansionary effect enough to push up the macroeconomic activity 
and hence unlimited public expenditures simply made the fiscal 
crisis worse. These opposing arguments. which lead to different 
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policy implica디ons ， are mostly due to different understanding of t11e 
macroeconomic analytical framework , Namely , the former hypothe~，is 
is basecl on the conventional Keynesian model of liquidity-
constrained agents , while the latter is based on the neoclassical 
model of rational agents. 
Althou핑h there have been a lot of controversial arguments on tlle 
effectiveness of fiscal policy in the 1990s , statistical evaluation has 
not been done well. Due to limiled availability of time series data 
concerning Japan’s fiscal policy in the 1990s , it is difficult to 
estimate quantita디vely how the Keynesian fiscal p이icy was really 
effective during the period 
Using the VAR method , Ihorí, Nakazato , and Kawacle (2002) 
showed that fiscal policies have generated limited effects on output 
in Japan. Namely, tax policies did not have a stronger effect than 
changes :ln government expen띠ture. Furthermore , the effect of fiscal 
policies was too marginal to recover macroeconomic activities , 
which is consistent with the latt잔r view based on the neoclassical 
model of rational agents. 
Therefore , we may say that the multiplier effect of public works 
has become very low in recent years , and hence the efficacy of 
stimula디ng aggregate demand by using public works is contJ'oJ-
versial. As the allocation of public works is not appropriately 
determined , it could not stimulate private consump디on or invest-
ment. The resulting cost is a hug~‘ increase in government deficit ln 
the 1990s. There are some empirical studies on the producti띠앙 
effect of public capital in Japan (Iwamoto 1990; Asako et a l. 1994; 
Mitsui and Ohta 1995; Doi 1998; Yoshino and Nakajima 1999; 
Ihori and Kondo 2001; and so on). They commonly conclude th o3.t 
public capital was productive but its productivity has declined 
recently. Results in 1990s suggest that the ‘non -Keynesian’ effect 
has some relevancy in Japan. When the fiscal situation becom션S 
very serious , fiscal reconstruction may stimulate private consump-
tion and investment due to the ‘non-Keynesian’ effect. 
IV. Sustainability of Government Bond in Japan 
By the end of FY 2002 , the long-term debt outstandings Jf 
central and local govemments are pr매ected to soar up to 705 
trillion yen or over 140% of GDP. The steep increases in govern-
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ment debt give rise to the concem of its future burden. Namely. 
the resulting increase in government deficits seriously raises doubt 
about the long-run sustainability of fiscal policy. In this section we 
inves디gate whether the cumulative accumulation of deficits could 
be consistent with long-term govemment solvency. 
A simple way to evaIuate the fiscal sustainabili양 problem is to 
focus on the Japanese Government Bond (JGB) market. 4 If 
creditors fear that the government is going to be in a debt trap. 
the long-term interest rate begins to rise. reflec디ng an enlarged 
credit risk. In this regard. despite its weakening credit ratings. the 
10-year JGB nominal yield of about 1.0% in 2003 remains lower 
than the U.S. bond yield of about 1.8% registered during the Great 
Depression. So far the myth that the JGBs are risk-free has been 
somehow propagated. This episode may imp1y that Japan’s 
govemment solvency is not a serious issue right now. 
However. we a1so have to pay attention to the possibility that the 
performance in the yie1d of the JGB may not accurately reflect its 
credit risk. The Japanese ban따ng sector continues to purchase the 
JGBs simp1y because short-term capita1 gains from the JGBs have 
been an easy option to offset the exis디ng stock 10sses. 
The ques디on of whether Japan’s fiscal policy has been sustainab1e 
in the sense of being consistent with an intertemporaI budget 
constraint has been concerned. There have been a few ana1yses on 
the sustainabili양 prob1em in the government debt in Japan. So 
long as we use the data until 1990. it seems that the government 
debt has been sustainable in Japan. However. as explained in 
Section I. deficits have increased rapidly since 1990. We are not 
sure if the present fiscal system in Japan may be sustainable in 
the long run. 
Ihori. Nakazato. and Kawade (2002) attempted a standard 
approach to test the fisca1 sustainability condition. using the 
methodolo양T of Hamilton and Flavin (1986). They conducted the 
empirical analysis for the Japanese fiscal data from 1957 to 1999. 
To conduct the test. the values for the nomina1 growth rate ‘ n. and 
the nominal interest rate. r. must be specified. Their strategy was 
to set various values for r • n and to check whether the results are 
4yhe JGB means the bond issued in the General Account of the national 
government. It dose not include borrowing in the other special accounts of 
the national govemment. 
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sensitive to the values chosen. The estimated results imply that the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected at a 5% significance level. 
sugges디ng that government solvency was not a serious problem 
until FY 1996. On the contrary , the result for the period 1957-97 
rejects the null hypothesis when r- n is above 0.05 , and the 
results for the period 1957-98 and the period 1957-1999 also reject 
the null hypothesis when r- n is above 0.04. These observations 
indicate that fiscal sustainability may become a serious issue. The 
longer the sample period. the more likely we face the fiscal cris:.s. 
It fo11ows that further fiscal expεmsion wi11 cause the public debt 
crisis to occur in the near future. 
Bohn 11998) proposed a new rnethod different from existing te은 ts 
for sustainability of government debt. Acc:ording to Bohn (1998) ‘ the 
test has better properties than the tests based on estimating a 
transversality condition and on cointegration tests. We apply the 
Bohn (1998) ’s method to tests on sustainability of Japanese 
government deb t. 
Bohn 11998) showed that the condition lbat fiscal policy satisfies 
the interternporal budget constrain t, i. e. the condition on sustain-
ability of government debt , is that the primary surplus to GDP(stl 
increases with the ratio of (start- of-period) debt to GDP(dtl. Stric1Jy 
speaking., when we can express a relation between the two as 
5 , 二 Jldtl • fL( ! 1) 
(Suppose other determinants , μ( ， is bounded and the present value 
of future GDP is finite), government debt satisfies a transversality 
condition if there is a debt-GDP ratio d* such that f' (dtl 는 더 >0 for 
a11 d( 르 d* (where β is a posi디ve constant). Bohn (1 998) found that 
an increase in the ratio of government debt to GDP raises the ratio 
of primalγ surplus to GDP for 1916-95 in the U.S. It suggests that 
U .S. fiscal p이icy is satisfying an intertemporal budget constraint. 
Doi and Ihori (2003) focus on the consolidated government 
including the General Account of the national governmeni, the 
Special Account for Grants of Allocation Tax and Transfer Taxes , 
and (net total of) local governments. We set the sample period as 
FY 1956-2000 and FY 1965-2000; FY 1965 is the year that t :1e 
central 당overnment begun to issue debt in the General Account 
after the '^끼NlI. We can get data on GDP , and the primary surplus 
and the government debt in the consolidated account for FY 
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1955-2000.5 
We consider estimation of equation (1). Bohn (1 998) sets j(dt) 二βdt
as a special case of equa디on (1). that is. 
St=βdt + ao + acGV ARt + αyYVARt +E t. (2) 
where GV ARt is a measure of temporary government expen버ture. 
YV ARt is a measure of cyclical variations in GDP. According to 
Barro (1 986). he defines GVARt드 (Gt-G*tl/ yt. and YVARt三 (Ut -
lf")(G칸/Yt). where Gt• G* t. Ut. and lf" denote real government 
expenditure. the permanent component of Gt• the unemployment 
rate and the median of Ut for the s밍nple period. respec디vely. We 
make data on G*t in Japan by using Beveridge and Nelson (1 981) 
decomposition of real government expen띠ture into temporary and 
permanent components. For FY 1955-2000. lf" is equal to 0.021 
Like Bohn (1998). assume j(dt) 二 βdt+7(dl a)2 , then 
St= βdt + y(dt • d)2 + Qo + αcGVAR，+ αy인1ARt+Et. (3) 
where d denotes the average of d t for the sample period. We 
estimate equations (2) and (3). 
1n estima디ng equa디ons (2) and (3). there exists serial correlation 
in the error terms of these equa디ons. Hence we use the maximum 
likelihood estimation with serial correlation in the error terms; Et = 
ρEt-l+ μt. Estimates of equa디on (2) are reported in regressions (1). 
(II). (\끼. and (VI) in Table 1. Also estimates of equation (3) are 
reported in regressions (III). (M. (\끼I). and (VIII) in Table 1. 
Regressions (I)-(M show results for the sample period FY 
1956-2000. and regressions M- (VIII) show results for the period FY 
1965-2000. p in Table 1 denotes the estimator of first order 
autocorrelation of the error term. For the sample period FY 
1956-2000. estimators of in the linear equation (2) are not 
significant. Also estimators of the first-order and second-order 
terms in the quadra디c equation (3) are insignificant. They suggest 
that we cannot find a positive response of the primary surplus-GDP 
ratio (s t) to changes in the debt-GDP ratio (dtl in the consolidated 
government for FY 1956-2000. 
5Ihori. Doi. and Kondo (2001) estimated the equation by using data on 
only the General Account of the national govemment for FY 1955-98. 
TABLE 1 
1'EST FOR SUSTAINABILITY 
Dependent variable: 5, 
Maximum likelihood estimation 띠야1 ann ual data 
n끼II) n끼1) (VI) (v) (IV) 때
 










































































































































110.297 112.948 110.200 11 1.382 143.023 145. 126 142.997 144.251 log L 
0.770 0 .790 0.788 0.786 0 .805 0.800 0.810 0.809 adj . R~ 
0.0121 0 .0115 0.0118 0.0116 0 .0115 0.0117 0.0113 0.0114 std. eπor 
-~ 
1.332 
Not f"<; : Thf' a hovf" fl::lr f"nthf"s f"s inniC'atf" the t-、ralues . D.W 
1.339 1.328 
denotes Durbin-Watson statistic. 
1.302 1.212 1. 182 1.217 1.193 D.W. 
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For FY 1965-2000. the estimator β is signific밍띠y positive in 
regression (V). As the estimator of YVAR is not signific윈lt in this 
regression. we exclude YV AR and reestimate 야le equation (2). Its 
result is reported in regression (VI). The estimator of β is 
insignificant in regression (VI). Similarly. estimators of the first-
order and second-order terms are insignifi떠nt in regression (VIII). 6 
They imply that we cannot obtain the result that Japanese 
govemment debt satisfies a tr밍lsvers려ity condition for FY 1965-
2000. 
From the above analysis. we c밍mot reject the hypothesis that 
the Japanese national debt has not been sustainable. We 핑ve an 
intuitive explana디on of the fact. We draw a scatter plot of 5t 
against d t in Figure 4. Until the early 1990s. the Jap와lese fiscal 
policy held the quadratic relation between the two. Recently. 삼le 
Japanese fiscal policy de띠ates from the relation excessively. This is 
one of the reasons we obtain the above result in this section. 
Japan has two serious difficulties in terms of Bohn’s 삼leore디C려 
framework. First. the Japanese primary surplus is apparently a 
decreasing function of the debt-GDP ratio since 1990 and hence it 
does not satisfy Bohn’s test. Second. the rate of interest is greater 
than the gro\\πh rate in Japan in the 1990s. Hence. it is important 
to reduce the govemment deficit in the near future. 
By the way. some could argue that the central and local 
govemments. al삼10U양1 hea띠ly indebted. 려so have credits and 
assets. The total value of the govemment-held tangible and 
financial assets-those of the central govemment. local govem-
ments and social security funds - 1s about ￥ 900 trillion. far more 
than the ￥ 700 trillion govemment debt. It is therefore argued that 
govemment debt is not a great concem because the net asset 
position is positive. 
Public pension funds. in particular. now hold assets of about 
￥200 trillion. a sum 없noun디ng to about two-thirds of the central 
govemment’s outs떠n며ng debt load. The funds are crea디ng net 
surpluses because contrtbutions exceed payouts. So. in terms of 
the general govemment (the cenσal 와ld local govemments plus 야le 
public pension fundsJ. the fiscal deficit is not extremely large. The 
t>rhough the coefficient of the first-order term is significantly positive in 
regression (\π0. the s밍ne coefficient 1s not signific밍lt in regression (VIII) 
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íncreasíng reserves ín the publíc pensíon funds help to offset. as ít 
were. the íncreasíng government debt. On balance. therefore. 
Japan ’s net físcal posítion does not look so seríous. 
To be sure. the sale of government-held assets trans1ates 
immediate1y into govemment revenue 밍ld thus reduces the debt. of 
the balance of the publíc bonds. However. the argument that debt 
is not much of a problem in net terms raises two questions. 
One question is just how many government assets could actually 
be s이d. Many govemment-held tangible assets exist in the form of 
public infrastructure. such as roads. These would be hard to sell 
By the same token. many of the fínancial assets. held in pension 
funds , are also unsalable. The pension reserves. of course. are 
intended to be dedicated to future payments to pensioners. The 
pension insurance premiums collected from working people must be 
paíd some time in the future. in the same way that public bonds 
must be redeemed as they mature. The pension fund is thud 
different from tax revenues. which the government can use freely. 
Another question is how these public pensíon funds will develop 
over the 10ng haul. The indicators are that balance of pension 
funds will deteriorate as the birthrate declines and the population 
ages. Perhaps 20 or 30 years from now. this could lead the overall 
government defícits to assume even more serious proportions. 
V. Local Interest Groups and Soft-Budget Problem 
1n addition to the concem that the accumulation of public debts 
may well be unsustainable. the expansionary fisca1 policy ín the 
1990s has another prob1em. Pro10nged excessive budget deficits are 
harmfu1 for the economy in the sense that excessive deficíts today 
mean higher polítical priví1eges tomorrow. which results in de1ay of 
restructuríng the fiscal system in a more efficíent way in the long 
run. 
1n Japan. the centra1 government pro꺼des heavy financia1 
support to loca1 governments. amounting to about 5% of GDP every 
fisca1 year due to the soft-budget problem ín the íntergovernmenta1 
financing. Many 1oca1 interest groups (or politicíans) seek to obtain 
more money from the centra1 and 10cal governments through a 
varíety of 10bbying activíties. They may be regarded as one of the 
most powerfu1 interest groups ín Japan. From the data on Japan ’s 
JAPAN ’S FlSCAL POLlCY 1: 7 
public works , in comparison with other countries' figures , we may 
say that local residents in Japan have larger privileges than in 
other countries ‘ reflec디ng an influential role of their interest 
groups. ln the 1990s , the government deficits in Japan increased 
rapidly because local interest 당roups li띠ng in the rural and 
agricultural area got a lot of transfers mainly in the form of public 
works. Agriculture-related public capitals and fishing ports and 
measures for flood control 밍ld conservation of forests are being 
accumulated too much due to lobbying activities of local interest 
groups. 
Lρcal 1\l.1ocation Tax Grants , as Shibata (1 993) described , is 
transferred from the national government to most of local 
governments without specifYing its use. The national government 
reseπes a certain ratio of nation떠 tax revenue in the General 
Account as a common fund for local governments. lt distributes 
funds to each local govemment according to their fiscal needs and 
local revenue sources , based on a detailed equation determined by 
the national government ‘ par디cularly the MPHPT. ln the General 
Account of the national government. Local Allocation Tax Grants 
distribution amounts to a certain percentage of national tax 
revenues that are determined by the Local Allocation Tax Law. 1t 
includes 32% of the revenue from the personal income tax and the 
liquor tax , 35.8%of the revenue from the company income tax and 
29.5% of the revenue from the consump디on tax , and 25% of the 
revenue from the tobacco tax. Total amount granted as Local 
Allocation Tax Grants in one fiscal year is once transferred from 
the General Account to the Special Account for Grants of Allocation 
Tax and Transfer Taxes. 
The amount distributing to each local government is determined 
as follows. Total amount is distributed 94% as an ordinary 
allocation tax and 6%as a special allocation tax. The latter 
compensates for special financial needs such as expense f:Jr 
disaster reconstruction and unforeseen events. The former to each 
local govemment is calculated according to the Basic Financial 
Needs and the Basic Financial Revenue. 1t is distributed to local 
gO\、vernment않s whose Basic Financial Needs exceed their Basi 
Financial Revenue. lt is not paid to local govemments whose Basic 
Financial Needs are less than their Basic Financial Revenue. 
The ratio of national taxes to local taxes within the total tax 
burden bome by Japanese citizens is approximately 2 to 1, but in 
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order to achieve balanced finances among all prefectures. a fixed 
percentage of national taxes are provided as Local Allocation Tax 
Grants to local governments for unrestricted use. Furthermore. the 
national government uses subsidies to make disbursements to local 
governments for specific purposes. Consequently. the final ratio on 
an expenditure basis is the reverse: namely. appro잉mately 1 to 2. 
In short. the financial resources needed by local bodies are 
transferred from the national government to local governments. 
In the second half of 1980s. national and local tax revenues 
increased and their Basic Financial Revenue that is related to local 
tax revenues. As we explained above. the total amount of Local 
Allocation Tax Grants increased automatically. If the calculation of 
the Basic Financial Needs and the Basic Financial Revenue was not 
revised. shortfalls of local governments. that is. the difference 
between the Basic Financial Needs and the Basic Financial 
Revenue. would have decreased. So the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(MHA; the present MPHPTj revised the calculation to increase only 
the Basic Finance Need. in proportion to total amount of Local 
Allocation Tax Grants. 
In the 1990s. national and local tax revenues decreased and 
their Basic Financial Revenue that is related to local tax revenues. 
Then total amount of Local Allocation Tax Grants decreased 
automatically. As the MHA did not revise the calculation of the 
Basic Financial Needs and the Basic Financial Revenue. shortfalls 
of local governments increased. The national government (the MOF 
and MHAl. however. increased total amount of Local Allocation Tax 
Grants by an increase of borrowing in the Special Account for 
Grants of Allocation Tax and Transfer Taxes. as shown ìn Figure 1. 
Under the Japanese fiscal system. the central government 
distributes Local Transfer Taxes. Local Allocation Tax Grants. and 
National Government Disbursements to local governments. 
Therefore. representatives of the Diet appeal to the cabinet or the 
central bureaucrats to distribute more in their own regions 
Get디ng more grants is important for them to be reelected. 
Allocation of region-specific privileges in the form of subsidies or 
public works from the central government has been mainly 
determined by the p이itical factor. 
It should be noted that a region paid fewer national taxes has 
received more grants from the national government. Kanto. Tokai. 
and Kinki regions live about 60% of the popula디on of Japan. and 
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people and firms in these regions pay about 75% of national tax.'~s 
in each year. However , they have received fewer grants than people 
in the rural regions: Hokkaido and Tohoku , Hokuriku and 
Koshin'etsu , Chugoku and Shikoku , and Kyushu. 
A reason why the central government distributes the grants in 
this way is as follows. More representatives in the ruling party. 
the LDP for postwar period. have been seated for the rural regions. 
People in the rural regions have more representatives in the ruling 
party than in the urban regions. The ruling party exerts an 
influence to decide the national budget. So the representatives for 
the rural regions , who affected by local interest groups and voters , 
put politiical pressure to distribute more grants to the rural regior:s. 
As sho\lm in Doi and Ashiya (1 997) , a region where more 
representatives in the ruling party are elected for is distribut，~d 
more subsidies from the central 당overnment throughout the period. 
1t is hence important to incorporate political influence of lo c:al 
interest 당roups explicitly into the an떠ytical framework. 
Although the central government can impose the ceili:1g 
constraint on some of public spending for fiscal reconstruction , it 
cannot easily restrain region-specific transfers. Doi and 1hori 
(2002) ’s empirical evidence indicates that lobbying activities of local 
interest groups was exaggerated in the 1990s , which is the main 
reason why fiscal reconstruction did not perform very well in t~e 
1990s. They have sho\lffi that raising taxes has the similar effect as 
an increase in GDP for the public sector. Namely , an increase in 
local and/or national taxes may result in an increase in lobbying 
activities of local interest groups ‘ The empirical inves디gation wüh 
respect to an increase in taxe딩 is consistent with the politico-
economic theoretical model developed in that paper. They have also 
sho\lffi that the steady-state level of government debt during fiscal 
reconstruction is increasing with the rate of time preference and 
the level of evaluation of public works , but is decreasing with the 
rate of interest. 1n par디cular ， an increase in the evaluation 
coefficient is relevant since it induces an increase in lobbying 
activities to seek for more pri띠leges during transition and larger 
deficits , while it reduces national-wide public goods ‘ SU2h 
movements were actually observed in the 1990s when the Japanese 
economy suffered from a slow-do\\m of economic growth. 
In order to realize successful fiscal reconstruction , the central 
government needs to restrain lobbying activities of local political 
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groups. Seeking to enhance efficiency and transparency by a new 
re-assessment system of public works is important to reduce local 
privileges. Reforming the local allocation tax system so that each 
local government has to collect taxes to finance its own spen띠ng is 
crucial for solving the soft budget problem. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
We have shown that the Japanese fiscal deficits are no longer 
sustainable. and hence that the Japanese government would face 
the severe fiscal situation in the near future. We should resume to 
reduce fiscal deficits as soon as possible. Before conclu띠ng the 
paper. let us fin떠ly examine the feasibility of fiscal consolidation in 
Japan. There seem to exist some p이i디cal constraints to resume 
fiscal reconstruction attempts from the experience of the failure of 
the Fiscal Structural Reform Act in 1998. In Japan. the central 
government cannot resume to reduce fiscal deficits before recovering 
stable economic growth. In other words. it cannot poli디cally change 
from the expansionary fiscal p이icy to the consolidation policy until 
the gro\\πh rate is held to plus without fiscal expenditure. In detail. 
we think that politicians can accept the idea of fiscal reconstruc-
tion only if the real GDP gro\\πh rate becomes more than 1 % for 4 
quarters continuously. Actually. 야le Japanese government planned 
such a change when the gro\\πh rates in the second and third 
quarters of 1999 were held to plus. but it could not obtain the 
policy go떠 because the growth rate became nega디ve again. as 
shown in Figure 3. 
Even though this condition is realized. the central government 
cannot purse fiscal reconstruction if another political condition is 
not satisfied. Namely. politicians can accept the idea of fiscal 
structural reform toward fiscal reconstruction only if the govern 
ment party occupies majority stably in the Diet. and hence the 
probability of dropping power is low enough. Among others. Persson 
and Svensson (1989). and Alesina and Tabellini (1 990) found that a 
stable government has an incentive to reduce government deficits. 
Also Alesina and Perotti (1 995. 1996) reported that coalition 
governments in OECD countries delayed reducing fiscal deficits. 
In Japan. the government par양 (야le LDP) has been weakened 
and budget deficits have been increased since the late of 1970s. 
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The LDP swept in the general elections of the House of Representa-
tives , and began to reduce fiscal deficits (fiscal reconstruction) in 
the 1980s. In the 1990s. especìaIly after 1993 , severaI par디es 
formed a coa려lì띠t디ion g맑overnment. and fiscal deficìts increased as 
mentioned above. The progress in Japan fits the findings of the 
above theoretical and empi꺼cal works. 
It is true that the current macroeconomic situation in 2003 is 
stiU severe. However , it would be a1so true that we would face more 
severe sus떠inability and difficult economic problems in the futu re 
since the speed of a.명ng is very rapid and the Japanese market 
system is behind the 'global standard.' Even if it is needed :0 
stimulate the aggregate demand , the traditional Keynesian polìcy 
seems ineffective. Furthermore. when the fiscal situation becomes 
very serious. 디scaI reconstruction may stimulate pπvate consump-
tion and investment due to the ‘non -Keynesian’ effect. It seems that 
the ‘non -Keynesian ’ effect has some relevancy in Japan. 
An effórt is being made to put an additionaI priority cn 
infrastructure investment to improve the people’s lìves and the 
environment in urban area. At the same time , seeking to enhance 
both efficiency and transparency, the efforts to reduce costs and 1:0 
utilize cost-benefit analysis have been complemented by a new 
re-assessment system. These changes are desirable but the speed ,)f 
structural reform is not so hi멍1. Further determined efforts are 
needed to reform publìc spending and taxation in a more efficient 
way. 
Japan’s fiscaI condition has deteriorated markedly over the past 
ten years. It is therefore impera디ve that deficit be reduced over an 
extended period. More specificaIly, the budget gap should be 
reduced 웰raduaIly over the next eight years , through 2013 , to a 
level at which the budget baIance-the b aIance including the 
interest and debt servicing-maintained. To this end , the deficit as 
a percentage of GDP needs to be cut by 1 percentage point each 
year. This target should be achieved through a combination I)f 
spending cuts and tax increases. 
(Received 2 February 2004: Revised 15 March 2004) 
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